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INTRODUCTION 
In the past year, scholarly and political consensus has become near 
uniform that the armed conflict Congress recognized in enacting the 
statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) after the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001 has materially changed.1 By its text 
 
 †  Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author wishes to 
thank Christopher Chyba, Eugene Fidell, Martin Flaherty, Steve Vladeck, and Sabin Willett for 
helpful comments. 
 1 See, e.g., ROBERT CHESNEY ET AL., A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR NEXT-GENERATION 
TERRORIST THREATS (Hoover Inst. ed., 2013), available at http://www.hoover.org/research/
statutory-framework-next-generation-terrorist-threats; Robert M. Chesney, Essay, Postwar, 5 
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 305, 315–22 (2014) (discussing Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)); Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. 
Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 115 (2014); Harold Hongjuh Koh, Sterling 
Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law Sch., Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Regarding Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan (May 21, 2014), 
available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf; Michael B. 
Mukasey, Written Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Regarding 
Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan (May 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mukasey_Testimony.pdf; President Barack 
Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Obama NDU 
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and the interpretation subsequently given it by successive 
administrations, Congress,2 and the courts,3 the AUMF authorizes the 
President to detain and lethally target individuals who are “part of or 
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.”4 Today, the Taliban no longer controls the Afghan 
government, and the U.S. military is set to withdraw the bulk of its 
combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.5 The United States 
has long since handed over control of its major in-theater detention 
facility to the Afghans.6 The core of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda 
that attacked the United States in 2001 has been substantially 
destroyed.7 And while dozens of new radical Islamic terrorist groups 
have emerged in the past decade—many of which share an ideological 
affiliation or even part of a name with the original al-Qaeda, some of 
which pose a threat to the United States—none of these actors were the 
focus of the original AUMF, aimed at those who perpetrated the attacks, 
or harbored the attackers, of September 11, 2001.8 
 
Speech], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-
national-defense-university. 
 2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat 1298 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 3 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“There can 
be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the 
Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for 
those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF.”); Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied en banc, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 4 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 & n.1 (quoting Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy 
Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul
2004/d20040707review.pdf); see also id. (“The AUMF authorizes the President to ‘use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.’” (quoting AUMF § 2(a))). 
 5 See President Barack Obama, Statement on Afghanistan (May 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan (noting 
that the United States will conclude combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014). 
 6 See, e.g., Richard Leiby, U.S. Transfers Control of Bagram Prison to Afghan Officials, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-transfers-prison-control-to-
afghan-officials/2012/09/10/7edf7496-fb17-11e1-875c-4c21cd68f653_story.html. The United 
States still retains control over a small number of non-Afghan prisoners held at the Bagram 
facility. See id. (“The United States also will retain custody of nearly 50 foreign nationals at 
Parwan—many of them Pakistanis accused of fighting for the Taliban.”); see also Spencer 
Ackerman, Revealed: The Hunger Strikes of America’s Most Secret Foreign Prisoners, GUARDIAN 
(July 16, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/bagram-detainees-
hunger-strikes-revealed (reporting that the United States continues to hold thirty-eight non-
Afghans at the facility). 
 7 See Obama NDU Speech, supra note 1. 
 8 See, e.g., JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR 
THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4–5 
(2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/203-congressional-
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Yet of all the complex problems associated with moving the United 
States away from the al-Qaeda–related “perpetual wartime footing,” as 
the President has urged,9 perhaps none has proven more vexing than 
that of resolving detention operations at the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay. The vast majority of the 149 detainees still held there 
arrived at the prison from Afghanistan well over a decade ago,10 and no 
new detainees have been brought to the prison for six years.11 Indeed, 
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama—as well as former 
presidential candidate John McCain and a host of senior military leaders 
and policy officials of both political parties—have called for the prison’s 
closure.12 Despite this, achieving the prosecution, transfer, or release of 
the remaining detainees has proven to be an extraordinary challenge. 
The reasons why it has proven so difficult to close Guantanamo are 
varied: the diplomatic need to find host countries for those who cannot 
be repatriated without facing the risk of torture or persecution, a step 
that would today violate settled law;13 the legal difficulty of prosecuting 




 9 See Obama NDU Speech, supra note 1. 
 10 Charlie Savage, Decaying Guantánamo Defies Closing Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014, at 
A1. 
 11 See FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 
GUANTANAMO TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT], available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/pdf/GTMOtaskforcereport_052810.pdf. 
 12 See, e.g., Senator John McCain, Speech on Foreign Policy at the World Affairs Council 
(Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/elections/mccains-speech-foreign-policy-march-
2008/p15834; President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-
security-5-21-09; Julian E. Barnes, Retired Military Brass Press Obama on Guantanamo Closure, 
WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/06/04/retired-military-brass-
press-obama-on-guantanamo-closure; Melissa McNamara, Bush Says He Wants to Close 
Guantanamo, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bush-says-he-wants-to-
close-guantanamo; Thérèse Postel, How Guantanamo Bay’s Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit 
More Terrorists, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2013/04/how-guantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda-recruit-more-terrorists/274956 (citing 
statements by Generals Petraeus and Powell favoring the closure of Guantanamo).  
 13 See GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 26–27; see also 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1242(a), 112 Stat. 
2681, 2822 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)) (“It shall be the policy of 
the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person 
to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United 
States.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 3, Apr. 18, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No State Party 
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”). 
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evidence has been made unusable by prisoner torture or abuse;14 
perennial problems with novel military commission trials, which have 
prolonged some war crime prosecutions for years;15 and the 
administration’s own concerns that some fraction of prisoners cannot 
be lawfully prosecuted but are nonetheless too dangerous to release.16 
Yet if some of the foregoing challenges are historically familiar 
problems of prisoner repatriation at the end of war,17 one significant 
contemporary obstacle to Guantanamo closure is without identifiable 
precedent. Beginning in 2009, Congress has attached spending 
restrictions to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), barring 
the transfer of Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any 
purpose,18 and barring the transfer of any Guantanamo detainee to any 
other country unless the Secretary of Defense determines that actions 
have or will be taken to “substantially mitigate the risk of such 
individual engaging or reengaging in any terrorist or other hostile 
activity that threatens the United States or United States persons or 
interests,” and that the transfer affirmatively “is in the national security 
interest of the United States.”19 While the 2014 NDAA somewhat 
loosened the restrictions placed on transfers of detainees outside the 
United States,20 the prohibition on the use of funds for transferring any 
of the detainees to the United States under any circumstances remains.21 
 
 14 See, e.g., GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 (“[T]he 
Task Force’s initial responsibility was to collect all government information, to the extent 
reasonably practicable, relevant to determining the proper disposition of each detainee. The 
government did not have a preexisting, consolidated repository of such information.”); id. at 22–
23; see also Joint Appendix at 103–05, Al Odah v. United States, 551 U.S. 1161 (2007) (No. 06-
1196) (quoting declaration of Lt. Col. Stephen A. Abraham as describing one Guantanamo 
hearing system as relying on incomplete evidence, scattered across agencies, and consisting only 
of statements of a “generalized nature—often outdated, often ‘generic,’ rarely specifically relating 
to the individual subjects of the [combatant status review tribunal hearings] or to the 
circumstances related to those individuals’ status”). 
 15 See, e.g., Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that it is 
unconstitutional for military commissions to try the offense of “providing material support for 
terrorism” for conduct occurring before 2006). 
 16 GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12. 
 17 See infra Parts I–VI. 
 18 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1034, 127 
Stat. 672, 851 (2013) [hereinafter 2014 NDAA] (“No amounts authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available to the Department of Defense may be used during the period beginning 
on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2014, to transfer, release, or 
assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions of 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee . . . .”); see also Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351; 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(d), 123 Stat. 1859, 1920–21. 
 19 2014 NDAA, supra note 18, § 1035(b). 
 20 Id. § 1035(a) (additionally authorizing transfer if pursuant to court order, or if the Secretary 
determines “that the individual is no longer a threat to the national security of the United States”). 
 21 Id. § 1034. 
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As a result, options the President might otherwise have for handling the 
cases of certain detainees—including criminal prosecution in a U.S. 
federal district court, or the release of detainees or transfer for 
continued detention to another prison facility inside the continental 
United States —are not available. 
As this Article demonstrates, in none of the major wars of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries in which U.S. detention operations 
are now concluded—World Wars I and II; Korea and Vietnam; and the 
1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars—has Congress imposed any such restriction 
on the exchange, transfer, or release of prisoners, during or after the 
period of armed conflict.22 Rather, for the hundreds of thousands of 
prisoners held during the course of these wars, the disposition of 
prisoners held pursuant to wartime authorities has always come to an 
end, and has always been handled by the executive branch. Among the 
most common mechanisms for the resolution of detention are executive 
agreements that provide for prisoner exchange, transfer, or release, 
negotiated with a wartime enemy, often through a neutral third-party 
intermediary.23 For all the controversy surrounding the Executive’s 
prisoner exchange agreement that resulted in the transfer of five 
Guantanamo detainees to Qatar and the release from Taliban custody of 
U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl,24 such arrangements are, from a 
historical perspective, prevailing U.S. custom. 
Does this historical practice matter? Should it? In separation-of-
powers debates, arguments based on historical practice have been 
central to Presidents’ claims that they enjoy broad authority under 
Article II of the Constitution to enter, for example, into executive 
agreements with foreign powers without gaining the advice and consent 
of the Senate needed to conclude a treaty.25 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has famously held that a long-standing executive practice, coupled with 
congressional “acquiescence” to the practice, may be enough in some 
 
 22 See infra Parts I–VI. This Article uses the term “prisoners” rather than, for example, 
“prisoners of war,” to indicate that it encompasses a broader set of detainees held by the United 
States during these armed conflicts, rather than only those formally entitled to prisoner of war 
status as that term is defined by the modern Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force with respect to the United States on February 2, 1956). While 
many of the detainees described here were indeed entitled to prisoner-of-war status, and were 
treated as such, the United States also held many other prisoners during these conflicts—
detainees ultimately determined to be civilians or otherwise not entitled to POW status per se. 
See, e.g., infra Part IV. 
 23 See infra Parts I–VI. 
 24 See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar et al., Key Questions in the Release of Bowe Bergdahl, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/05/world/asia/key-questions-in-the-
release-of-bowe-bergdahl.html. 
 25 See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondents at 40–41, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654 (1981) (No. 80-2078), 1981 WL 390302. 
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cases to lend a “gloss” to the meaning of the executive power under 
Article II—a reflection of the common understanding of both political 
branches as to the substantive scope of constitutional authority.26 To the 
extent the Obama Administration and others have questioned the 
constitutionality of the NDAA restrictions on executive power to 
conclude agreements resulting in the release of Guantanamo 
detainees,27 there is little doubt that claims from practice would figure 
centrally in any elaborated argument.28 
Yet as the Supreme Court and scholars have long recognized, 
reliance on congressional acquiescence to past practice as an indicator 
of constitutional meaning is problematic at best. Congressional silence 
on any particular executive action may be a reflection of congressional 
approval; it might also be a reflection of congressional ignorance, 
uncertainty, or indifference.29 Further, it is rarely entirely clear to what 
extent either Congress or the President has acted based on an 
understanding of its own constitutional power. In the foreign relations 
context, it may be especially unclear whether a particular executive 
action is taken pursuant to an executive understanding of statutory 
delegation, or based on the Executive’s view of its own Article II 
authority. Moreover, elevating practice to the level of constitutional 
significance also poses a serious, formal problem of interpretation; it 
seems unlikely that the same legal effect should attach both to 
 
 26 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942). 
 27 See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304 (Dec. 26, 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-3304 
(“Section 1035 of this Act gives the Administration additional flexibility to transfer detainees 
abroad by easing rigid restrictions that have hindered negotiations with foreign countries and 
interfered with executive branch determinations about how and where to transfer detainees. 
Section 1035 does not, however, eliminate all of the unwarranted limitations on foreign transfers 
and, in certain circumstances, would violate constitutional separation of powers principles. The 
executive branch must have the flexibility, among other things, to act swiftly in conducting 
negotiations with foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee transfers.”); see also 
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 38–40, Ajam v. Butler, No. 14-5116 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2014), 
available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Ajam-Brief.pdf (“By 
conditioning the substance of any agreement with a transferee nation . . . and addressing the 
nature and conduct of the transferee nation . . . Congress intrudes upon the President’s 
management of delicate foreign relations.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 28 Important additional questions surround the constitutionality of the Executive’s action in 
the Bergdahl case. In particular, the President apparently failed to comply with the current NDAA 
restrictions on detainee transfers, requiring the President give Congress thirty days’ notice before 
the transfer or release of any detainee release from Guantanamo Bay. See 2014 NDAA, supra note 
18, at § 1035(d) (“The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of 
a determination of the Secretary under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 30 days before the 
transfer or release of the individual under such subsection.”). 
 29 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 414–16 (2012) (summarizing arguments against reliance on 
congressional acquiescence to past executive practice). 
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congressional silence, and to affirmative legislation that has satisfied the 
express hurdles of bicameral passage and presentment to the executive.30 
In any case, one need not embrace historical practice as evidence of 
constitutional meaning to conclude that such a practice has salience in 
current statutory and policy debates. Arguments surrounding the 
present extraordinary congressional involvement in the disposition of 
the Guantanamo prisoners seem to rely in some measure on a sense that 
current circumstances are uniquely challenging because prisoners’ home 
countries are politically unstable or in the midst of continuing conflict 
themselves; prisoners still harbor violent intentions toward the United 
States; the United States continues to face short- and long-term threats 
from groups that share ideological commitments with the men at 
Guantanamo; prisoner exchanges empower the enemy; and so forth.31 
Such factors are challenges indeed. But, as this Article seeks to 
demonstrate, they are deeply and historically familiar features of the end 
of war. 
This Article offers a brief account of when and how the United 
States has handled the release of prisoners held in its custody during and 
after periods of armed conflict in the past century. It is not meant to 
endorse the wisdom or legality of all such efforts. On the contrary, some 
of the practices described, such as the transfer of German prisoners of 
war (POWs) to Allied nations following World War II for use as labor 
in national reconstruction projects, were and are unquestionably 
problematic as a matter of law.32 Rather, it is meant principally to 
describe how the United States has concluded its prisoner operations in 
past armed conflicts—conflicts involving thousands and often tens of 
thousands of prisoners, including (during World War II) hundreds of 
thousands held inside the continental United States.33 A handful of these 
 
 30 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 91 
(1988) (“For every case where the Court rhapsodizes about deliberative inaction, there is a 
counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing critique. ‘To explain the cause of non-action 
by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities[’] . . . .” 
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119–20 (1940))). 
 31 See, e.g., GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12; David E. 
Sanger & Matthew Rosenberg, Critics of P.O.W. Swap Question the Absence of a Wider Agreement, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at A7 (quoting Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chairman of the 
House Intelligence Committee, as arguing that exchange of Taliban prisoners for American POW 
has “empowered” the Taliban by giving them U.S. government recognition). 
 32 See infra Part II. The relevant international law regulating the repatriation of prisoners in 
the current armed conflict is treated separately elsewhere. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the 
End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 33 See infra Part II. Although the focus of this Article is on armed conflicts of the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, the history of U.S. prisoner detention during wartime manifestly 
begins in the revolutionary era. See, e.g., GEORGE G. LEWIS & JOHN MEWHA, HISTORY OF 
PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776–1945, at 1–16 (facsimile ed. 
1988); PAUL J. SPRINGER, AMERICA’S CAPTIVES: TREATMENT OF POWS FROM THE 
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prisoners were eventually tried for crimes, including war crimes under 
international law. But the vast majority of them were simply released, 
either while hostilities were still ongoing or shortly after hostilities came 
to an end, and were repatriated to their home countries, transferred to 
other nations, granted asylum in the United States, or exchanged for 
American prisoners held by still deeply distrusted enemies. These 
arrangements were made by the executive branch—often by the military 
directly, sometimes through more formal executive agreement—and 
were generally informed by overarching treaty obligations previously 
undertaken by the United States. While the disposition of wartime 
prisoners has regularly been the subject of intense public attention at the 
end of war, particularly to the extent the fate of our own prisoners was 
at stake, Congress’ current engagement on disposition of a handful of 
particular prisoners held at one facility in this armed conflict is without 
precedent in the past century. 
I.     WORLD WAR I 
From the time the United States entered World War I on the side 
of its European allies in April 1917, until the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles in June 1919, the United States held tens of thousands of 
prisoners in both Europe and the United States. Between June 1918 and 
March 1919 alone, the Army’s Department of the Provost Marshal 
General (PMG) reports handling 48,280 enemy prisoners.34 Pursuant to 
regulations adopted in the months before the United States declared 
war, the War Department (today, the Department of Defense) was given 
 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2010). For a particularly insightful history of the 
treatment and disposition of Civil War–era prisoners, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: 
THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012). 
 34 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 59 (describing the PMG as an office that has existed in 
wartime since the Revolutionary War); JOHN J. PERSHING, FINAL REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 66-626, 
at 85 (1920) [hereinafter PERSHING REPORT], available at https://archive.org/details/finalreportof
gen00unit (“All prisoners taken by the American troops were kept at least 30 kilometers behind 
our lines under guard by the Provost Marshal General’s Department . . . .”). In addition, the U.S. 
Justice Department interned approximately 4000 civilian “alien enemies” inside the United States 
pursuant to Congress’ declaration of war and a series of presidential proclamations imposing 
restrictions on enemy alien activities. See President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation No. 1443, 
Extending Regulations Prescribing the Conduct Toward Alien Enemies to Include Women (April 
19, 1918); President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation No. 1408, Setting Forth Additional 
Regulations Prescribing Conduct toward Alien Enemies (Nov. 16, 1917); President Woodrow 
Wilson, Proclamation No. 1364, Declaring the Existence of a State of War with the German 
Empire and Setting Forth Regulations Prescribing Conduct toward Alien Enemies (April 6, 1917). 
These civilian prisoners were interned in the same War Department camps as the war prisoners, 
and held in separate quarters. RICHARD B. SPEED III, PRISONERS, DIPLOMATS, AND THE GREAT 
WAR: A STUDY IN THE DIPLOMACY OF CAPTIVITY (1990). 
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responsibility for holding all captured war prisoners in U.S. custody.35 
While the U.S. Secretaries of War and State initially debated where 
captured prisoners should be held—the War Department was interested 
in preserving prisoner labor for use by allied forces in Europe, while the 
State Department was concerned that holding its prisoners outside the 
United States might violate existing treaty obligations—it was the Army 
that ultimately prevailed. Most prisoners captured by the United States 
in France would be held in theater, and only officers would (for a time) 
be sent to the United States for detention.36 Total figures vary 
somewhat, but in the end, approximately 1400 war prisoners were held 
in United States—a population that included officers seized in Europe as 
well as crews from German ships found near U.S. ports, many at the 
opening of hostilities.37 
At the broadest level, a series of international agreements shaped 
the disposition of prisoners at the end of the war. For example, most of 
the belligerent states (including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany) had ratified the Hague Convention of 1907; it 
provided, consistent with then-recent international practice, that 
“[a]fter the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war 
shall be carried out as quickly as possible.”38 According to the final 
report prepared for Congress by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied 
Expeditionary Forces, General John Pershing, the PMG was, thus, 
“instructed to follow the principles of The Hague and the Geneva 
conventions in the treatment of prisoners,” although the United States 
hedged on whether these treaties were legally binding upon it “in the 
present war.”39 
More specific to the instant conflict, the belligerent parties entered 
into an Armistice agreement to bring about a ceasefire on the western 
front on November 11, 1918; the terms of the agreement were 
negotiated by President Wilson on behalf of the United States. As the 
President publicly explained to a joint session of Congress on the day of 
 
 35 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 50–51. The December 14, 1916 “Regulations Governing 
the Transfer of Prisoners of War from the Custody of the Navy to that of the Army” provided that 
the War Department would hold all war prisoners in its custody. Id. at 50. These regulations were 
later formally promulgated as Special Regulations No. 62, “Custody of Prisoners of War” 1917, 
shortly before the United States declared war. Id. at 51. 
 36 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 52–53; see also SPEED, supra note 34, at 126–27. 
 37 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 57 (indicating 1346 prisoners held in the United States). 
The War Department’s Annual Report of 1918 cites 1411 POWs as being held in the United States 
at Ft. McPherson, Georgia as of June 30, 1918. WAR DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY 
OF WAR: 1918, at 189–90 (1918). 
 38 Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land art. 20, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 
Hague Convention]; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
 39 PERSHING REPORT, supra note 34, at 85. 
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the signing, the Armistice required Germany immediately to repatriate 
all allied prisoners; Germany, in contrast, would enjoy no such 
immediate reciprocity.40 The disposition of remaining war prisoners 
would be a topic of negotiation in connection with a broader peace 
treaty; the allied governments agreed that these negotiations would 
remain secret until the final settlement was announced.41 In the end, the 
Treaty of Versailles indeed included detailed provisions setting forth the 
terms for prisoner exchanges and repatriation, including the 
requirement that “repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians 
shall take place as soon as possible after the coming into force of the 
present Treaty and shall be carried out with the greatest rapidity.”42 
Ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles were finally exchanged by the 
European governments on January 10, 1920, prisoners were released, 
and Allied Expeditionary Forces headquarters in France was shut down 
by August 31, 1920.43 
Perhaps ironically, in the face of this vigorous international 
diplomacy, neither the Armistice nor the Treaty of Versailles turned out 
to guide U.S. prisoner repatriation significantly in practice. The 
Armistice imposed essentially no obligations on the United States to 
repatriate prisoners. And, caught up in irresolvable debate over 
President Wilson’s League of Nations proposal, the U.S. Senate never 
succeeded in ratifying the Versailles Treaty.44 Despite this, the United 
States remained highly motivated to end its prisoner operations in the 
United States and abroad, driven by the intense cost of maintaining its 
prison infrastructure and its desire to demobilize from war in general. 
 
 40 WOODROW WILSON, TERMS OF ARMISTICE SIGNED BY GERMANY: ADDRESS OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 65-1139, 
at 5–6 (1918).  
 41 Military Terms for Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1918), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/
archive-free/pdf?res=9807EED61539E13ABC4A53DFB7678383609EDE. 
 42 Treaty of Versailles art. 214, June 28, 1919, 2 U.S.T. 43, 2 Bevans 43; see also, e.g., id. art. 216 
(“From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German authorities the prisoners of war 
and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said authorities. 
Those amongst them who before the war were habitually resident in territory occupied by the 
troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the 
consent and control of the military authorities of the Allied and Associated armies of 
occupation.”); id. art. 220 (“Prisoners of war or other German nationals who do not desire to be 
repatriated may be excluded from repatriation; but the Allied and Associated Governments 
reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them or to take them to a neutral country or to 
allow them to reside in their own territories.”); id. art. 221 (“The Allied and Associated 
Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German prisoners of war or German 
nationals in their hands conditional upon the immediate notification and release by the German 
Government of any prisoners of war who are nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers and 
may still be in Germany.”). 
 43 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 63. 
 44 Senate Defeats Treaty, Vote 49 to 35; Orders it Returned to the President, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 1919), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0319.html. 
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Indeed, the United States began repatriating war prisoners before any 
other allied nation.45 Repatriation was handled entirely through the 
executive branch and largely in accordance with the provisions of the 
broad instructions of The Hague and Geneva Conventions.46 Enemy 
medical officers and other “sanitary personnel” were repatriated first, 
followed on April 9, 1919, by prisoners who were determined to be 
“permanently unfit for further military duty” or could otherwise not 
perform useful labor.47 Full repatriation of German prisoners held in 
Europe began September 7, 1919 and—perhaps in light of the relatively 
small number of prisoners by then under American control—took just 
seventeen days to complete.48 By the close of 1919, the U.S. Army held 
just over 1300 prisoners in the United States.49 In the following year, the 
number would drop to forty-four (including both POWs and interned 
“enemy aliens”)—all of these in hospitals receiving treatment, nearly all 
to be soon deported or released.50  
Critically, throughout this period, Congress evinced essentially no 
interest in engaging questions regarding the release or repatriation of 
the vast bulk of enemy prisoners. This was hardly for lack of interest in 
the handling of the war or the enemy in general, or for lack of concern 
about the security threat posed by German nationals in the United 
States and abroad. Galvanized by aggressive propaganda campaigns and 
the 1916 explosion of a munitions facility in New York Harbor, rumors 
abounded domestically throughout the period of the threat posed by a 
broad network of German spies and saboteurs preparing to attack 
America from within.51 Congress thus adopted statutes such as the 1917 
Trading with the Enemy Act, providing for, among other things, the 
temporary seizure of enemy property in the United States until disputes 
surrounding its ownership could be resolved.52 Congress likewise passed 
various laws during the war providing for the appropriation of stipends 
 
 45 SPEED, supra note 34, at 178–79. 
 46 PERSHING REPORT, supra note 34, at 85; SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 140. 
 47 PERSHING REPORT, supra note 34, at 85. 
 48 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 140. 
 49 WAR DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: 1920, at 289 (1920). 
 50 WAR DEP’T, REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY TO THE SECRETARY OF 
WAR 94 (1921). 
 51 SPEED, supra note 34, at 156. 
 52 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, § 7(c), 40 Stat. 411 (current version at 50 
U.S.C. § 7(c) (2012)) (providing that “[i]f the President shall so require, any money or other 
property . . . held . . . for the benefit of, an enemy” be conveyed to an Alien Property Custodian, 
who would hold all rights in the property unless and until any disputes involving the legitimate 
ownership of the property required its return). President Wilson later issued a presidential 
proclamation clarifying that any prisoner of war counted as an “enemy” within the meaning of 
the law. Proclamation No. 1427, Proclamation Including Germans and Austro-Hungarians in the 
Custody of the War Department Within the Term “Enemy” for the Purposes of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act (Feb. 5, 1918). 
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for American POWs held by the enemy, as well as provisions for the 
hospitalization of prisoners determined to be insane.53 
As the war moved toward a close, Congress had additional cause 
for concern about the security impact of the release of its prisoners: 
conditions in post-war Germany were the opposite of stable. The 
German economy had collapsed, along with its political order; Allied 
blockades had left swaths of the population near starvation.54 Thousands 
of Russian prisoners held by Germany during the war set out to flee the 
country, mostly on foot, and thousands of them died en route—some of 
cold or hunger, many of ongoing violence.55 
Yet while Congress proved itself more than willing and able to 
block the executive’s wishes in some matters—the Senate’s refusal to 
ratify the Treaty of Versailles was seen as a particularly devastating blow 
to President Wilson56—Congress passed no laws regarding U.S.-held 
POWs, and no laws so much as mentioning the Armistice.57 Indeed, 
even as Congress debated various aspects of the Treaty of Versailles 
extensively, and the Treaty itself contained detailed provisions regarding 
the disposition of war prisoners, there was essentially no discussion in 
Congress of prisoner issues surrounding the debates on the Treaty.58 
II.     WORLD WAR II 
Congress evinced a similar disinclination to engage in such 
questions at the end of World War II. Here, the relative lack of 
 
 53 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 16, 1918, ch. 55, 40 Stat. 530 (providing $80,000 for Americans taken 
POWs); Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 79, 40 Stat. 373 (authorizing Secretary of War to transfer internees 
and POWs to civilian hospital for mental health care). 
 54 SPEED, supra note 34, at 171. 
 55 Id. Many of those who survived returned to Russia to join the Bolshevik forces, staunchly 
opposed by the Allies, ultimately contributing to the ascendancy of the Communists, who would 
become America’s primary ideological enemy for the second half of the century. Id. at 172–73. 
 56 See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 7 (2011) (“Tragically, 
his greatest triumph sowed the seeds of his greatest defeat. . . . [The Treaty of Versailles] might 
have had the chance to work if the victors had stuck by it in years to come, but they soon showed 
they would not. The first of the victors to renege was the United States, which never ratified the 
Treaty of Versailles and never joined the organization that Wilson helped establish to maintain 
the peace . . . .”); see also Senate Defeats Treaty, Vote 49 to 35; Orders it Returned to the President, 
supra note 44. 
 57 This conclusion is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large database, for any laws enacted 
between 1918 and 1919 that included the terms “prisoners of war” or “armistice” in the text of the 
statute. See United States Statutes at Large, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=STATUTE (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 58 This conclusion is based on a search of HeinOnline’s U.S. Congressional documents 
collection, for any documents (from 1918–1920) including the terms “armistice” and “prisoner.” 
See U.S. Congressional Documents, HEINONLINE. This conclusion is also based on a search of 
ProQuest’s Congressional publications collection, for any publications (from 1918–1919) 
including the terms “prisoner” and “Versailles.” See Congressional Publications, PROQUEST. 
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congressional engagement on questions of prisoner release was perhaps 
even more surprising. The United States held more than seven million 
prisoners during the course of World War II—more POWs  than in 
every other American conflict combined.59 Almost 400,000 of these 
prisoners were brought to the United States for detention during the 
war,60 to be housed in prisoner camps erected across the American 
heartland.61 
The vast population of prisoners held in the United States 
generated a host of domestic political debates, and Congress was far 
from disengaged. Between 1940 and 1947, Congress passed several 
statutes relating to the handling of POWs, from criminal laws to deal 
with prisoners who might escape,62 to labor laws regulating how prison 
labor could best be utilized.63 Indeed, perhaps no issue related to the 
housing of prisoners in the United States garnered more attention than 
whether and how war prisoners should be used to aid the economy at 
home. The 1929 Geneva Convention permitted the use of prisoner labor 
under various conditions,64 and agriculture, industry, and various 
agencies of the U.S. federal government quickly came to rely on prisoner 
labor heavily.65 Labor leaders in turn regularly engaged members of 
Congress in efforts to limit the use of such labor, out of growing 
concern that the employment of prisoners was taking jobs away from 
American citizens.66 
Congress also had additional reason to engage on prisoner issues: 
the prospect of prisoner release in this conflict did not wait until the end 
of the war. Arranged primarily with the aid of neutral Swiss 
intervention, Germany and the United States carried out prisoner 
exchanges throughout the war. More than 1000 German POWs were 
 
 59 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 143. 
 60 Id. at 146. 
 61 ARNOLD KRAMMER, NAZI PRISONERS OF WAR IN AMERICA 26–31 (Stein & Day 1979) 
(listing major German prisoner of war internment camps in states from Massachusetts and 
Maine, to Wisconsin, Missouri and Oklahoma, to Texas, California, and Wyoming). 
 62 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1945, ch. 103, 59 Stat. 101 (“An Act [r]elating to escapes of 
prisoners of war and interned enemy aliens”); see also S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY REP. NO. 180 
(1945) (statement of Sen. McCarran, describing problem of civilians helping prisoners of war to 
escape, and lack of prosecution options in these cases short of treason). 
 63 See Act of July 16, 1943, ch. 242, 57 Stat. 566 (provides for use of POWs on conservation 
and water projects until six months after cessation of hostilities in the present war as determined 
by proclamation of the President or concurrent resolution of Congress). 
 64 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 27, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Convention] (“Belligerents may employ as 
workmen prisoners of war who are physically fit, other than officers and persons of equivalent 
statue, according to their rink and their ability.”). 
 65 See id. arts. 27–34. See generally LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, ch. 11. 
 66 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 160–61. 
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returned in five separate exchanges.67 In Europe, U.S. military command 
in the field further repatriated large numbers of prisoners throughout 
the conflict; indeed, near the end of the war, many German prisoners 
were captured, disarmed, and immediately released without being 
formally processed into prison camps.68 
Despite the inescapable political salience of prisoner issues, it was 
the War Department that again took responsibility for—indeed, insisted 
upon—the relatively rapid post-war repatriation of all U.S.-held 
prisoners.69 As in previous conflicts, prevailing treaties provided some 
broad guidance on the repatriation of prisoners post-conflict. Similar to 
the Hague Convention before it, the 1929 Geneva Convention on 
Prisoners of War provided that the “repatriation of prisoners shall be 
effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace.”70 
Also, as in previous conflicts, executive branch agreements with our 
wartime enemies set further terms for prisoner repatriation.71 Initial 
armistice agreements with Italy and Japan required the defeated powers 
to effect the immediate handover of all Allied prisoners, with no 
reciprocal commitment by the Allies to return prisoners held.72 An 
agreement between the Allied powers and Germany—drafted by the 
Allied powers—also required the release of all Allied prisoners without 
making any reciprocal commitment for the unconditional release of 
Allied-held German prisoners.73 A subsequent peace treaty with Italy 
 
 67 KRAMMER, supra note 61, at 229. 
 68 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 146 (citing EARL F. ZIEMKE, THE U.S. ARMY IN THE 
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 1944–1946, at 291 (1975)). 
 69 KRAMMER supra note 61, at 229, 233–35. 
 70 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 64, at art. 75. 
 71 See Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International 
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 352–56 (1955) (“A familiar exercise of the Commander in Chief 
power has been the conclusion of armistice agreements with defeated enemies. Perhaps the first 
use of this power was the agreement terminating the Spanish-American War.”). 
 72 See Italian Military Armistice, U.S.-It., Sept. 3, 1943, 61 Stat. 2740 (agreement between 
General Eisenhower, Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Allied Forces, and Marshal Pietro 
Badoglio, Head of Italian Government, requiring immediate handover of all prisoners to CINC 
Allied Forces without commitment regarding return of prisoners by Allied side); see also 
Surrender by Japan: Terms between the United States of America and the other Allied Powers and 
Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733 (“We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and 
the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and 
civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, 
maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.”); Armistice Agreement 
between the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Hungary, Jan. 20, 1945, 59 Stat. 1321; 
Agreement between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the 
United Kingdom, and Bulgaria, Respecting an Armistice, Oct. 28, 1944, 58 Stat. 1498; Agreement 
between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United 
Kingdom and Rumania Respecting an Armistice, Sept. 12, 1944, 59 Stat. 1712. 
 73 See Declaration Regarding Germany by the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Social Republics, and the 
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committed the Allies to repatriate Italian prisoners “as soon as possible 
in accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the individual Powers 
detaining them and Italy.”74 An executive agreement reached on July 26, 
1945 between President Truman, U.K. Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, and Chairman of the Nationalist Government of China 
Chiang Kai-shek, likewise promised the repatriation of Japanese 
prisoners following Japan’s surrender in the war.75 As for Germany, the 
initial agreement among the parties remained the prevailing instrument 
in force regarding prisoners; it provided that repatriation of German 
POWs should be delayed until the end of the war with Japan, until the 
conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Germany, or for such time as 
prisoner labor remained needed for rebuilding and restoration, or for 
other security considerations.76 
Even as these agreements were being negotiated, in May 1945, the 
Department announced its policy of returning all POWs in the United 
States to Europe “as rapidly as possible ‘consistent with’ the need for 
their labor on essential military and contract work, and the military 
situation abroad.”77 The “consistent with” exception was a concession to 
those in U.S. agriculture and industry who feared losing so much free 
labor precipitously. For a brief time, those needs actually succeeded in 
delaying the repatriation of some prisoners; the President announced a 
sixty-day deferment in the return of contract prisoners to address a 
temporary labor shortage in various agricultural sectors.78 While some 
members of Congress pushed for further extensions, President Truman 
stuck with the War Department schedule,79 and Congress took no 
further action on the issue.80 
 
Provisional Government of the French Republic, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, T.I.A.S. No. 1520 
[hereinafter Declaration Regarding Germany] (providing (in Article 15) for cessation of 
hostilities, assumption of provisional authority over Germany by victorious Allies, and requiring 
(in Article 6) release of all Allied prisoners to Allies under terms set by Allies without reciprocal 
promise); see also Surrender by Germany: Terms between the United States of America and the 
other Allied Powers and Germany, May 7–8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1857. 
 74 Treaty of Peace with Italy, U.S.-It., art. 71, ratified June 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245 (entered into 
force Sept. 15, 1947) (“Italian prisoners of war shall be repatriated as soon as possible in 
accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the individual Powers detaining them and Italy.”). 
 75 The Potsdam Declaration outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan, and 
provided that POWs would be returned to their homes after surrender to effect. LEWIS & MEWHA, 
supra, note 33, at 258. 
 76 Declaration Regarding Germany, supra note 73.  
 77 KRAMMER, supra note 61, at 231 & n.12 (quoting ARMY SERVICE FORCES, CIRCULAR NO. 
191 (1945)); see also LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 172. 
 78 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 173. 
 79 Id. (describing Truman’s urging that POW labor be replaced with returning U.S. war 
veterans). 
 80 Allied prisoners were not always sent directly home. The United States entered into 
agreements with several of its European allies providing that U.S.-held prisoners would be sent 
first to, for example, France, for use in post-war reconstruction projects. Despite sharp objections 
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Repatriation efforts of prisoners held inside the United States thus 
proceeded at a relatively brisk pace. The War Department designated 
so-called Italian Service Units, volunteer units of Italian POWs in the 
United States, for the earliest repatriation as reward for their wartime 
service; all Italian POWs were returned home by March 1946.81 
Beginning as early as 1944, some members of Congress began pushing 
the President to accelerate efforts to secure prisoner exchanges with 
Japan, out of concern for the treatment of American soldiers held by the 
Japanese.82 But the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, tasked with 
evaluating legislative options, ultimately recommended against 
congressional action on the grounds that the State Department was 
already taking all possible steps to secure the release of American 
prisoners. And indeed, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, 
half of all U.S.-held Japanese prisoners were home by end of 1945, all by 
the end of 1946.83 
The release of German prisoners was handled on somewhat 
different terms, but ultimately with similar results. The War 
Department unsurprisingly prioritized the repatriation of especially 
young, old, and sick prisoners; perhaps more surprising, the 
Department also prioritized the repatriation of prisoners deemed 
“hardened Nazis” as “useless” for labor purposes and therefore readily 
returnable.84 With some exceptions —for prisoners to be held for war 
crimes prosecution and for prisoners deemed to be providing essential 
labor—German detainees were given the option of repatriation or 
rehiring as voluntary civilian workers.85 By July 1946, with the exception 
of 141 Germans serving prison sentences, and near that number still 
held in hospitals or psychiatric wards, all German prisoners had left the 
United States.86 
In Europe, repatriation was generally carried out by regional 
commands,87 with the Mediterranean Theater of Operations Prisoner of 
War Command tasked with repatriating on the order of 100,000 
German POWs,88 and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), approximately 700,000 prisoners were 
transferred by the United States to France pursuant to such an agreement. Id. at 240–41. 
 81 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 148; see also LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 190. 
 82 See SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 78th Cong., EXCHANGE OF 
AMERICAN CITIZENS INTERNED OR HELD PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE JAPANESE 1 (Comm. Print 
1951). 
 83 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 149. 
 84 KRAMMER supra note 61, at 237. 
 85 Id. at 249. 
 86 Id. at 255. 
 87 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 259–60 (noting that repatriation efforts were suspended 
for several months in early 1946 due to labor shortages, to resume again in August 1946). 
 88 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 192. 
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Force in Europe (SHAEF) (commanded by General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower) responsible for repatriating hundreds of thousands more.89 
As in the United States, by summer 1945, SHAEF was releasing all 
young, old, and female prisoners, along with those prisoners deemed of 
insufficient labor value. Repatriation was slowed to an extent by the 
active interest of various allied European powers in securing the use of 
prisoner labor for post-war rebuilding efforts, and for a time U.S. forces 
undertook negotiations to hand over some of its prisoners to allied 
governments in exchange for assurances that the prisoners once 
transferred would be treated in accordance with Geneva standards. But 
these programs were ultimately short lived, rejected in the face of the 
ICRC’s sharp criticism over post-war use of prisoner labor, U.S. 
concerns with managing the planned return to Europe of 260,000 
additional prisoners who had been held in the United States, and desires 
to speed U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe generally. SHAEF was thus 
keen to schedule the complete closeout of its prison operations by end 
of June 1947, a goal it effectively achieved.90 In the end, the United 
States was the first Allied nation to free its war prisoners in Europe.91 
Yet again, for all of Congress’s active involvement in other war-
related (including prisoner-related) issues, and despite the vast social 
and economic impact that holding that many prisoners had on the 
domestic United States,92 Congress enacted no laws throughout this 
period respecting whether or how any of the prisoners were to be 
released.93 As in World War I, it was hardly as if the U.S. public or its 
representatives were oblivious to the matter of transfer or release. On 
the contrary, public debates over the disposition of prisoners were 
active, dominated in the first instance by concerns about finding 
replacement labor for the prisoners who were now to be returned 
home.94 Others raised serious security concerns that Nazis sent home 
would again pose a security threat,95 or that the return of so many 
 
 89 Exact numbers of prisoners captured and repatriated from European-based detention 
facilities remain difficult to ascertain, in part because some detainees were captured and released 
without formal processing. See SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 146. 
 90 LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 33, at 242–43 (noting that the last American-held POW was 
released on June 30, 1947). 
 91 KRAMMER, supra note 61, at 249. 
 92 See, e.g., id. at xiii–xv. 
 93 This conclusion is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large for any laws (from 1940–
1947) including “prisoners of war” in the text, as well as a search of ProQuest Congressional (all 
sources, same time period) for documents including the term “prisoners of war”; see also id. at 
232–34. 
 94 Labor interests demanded prisoners’ immediate repatriation to avoid concerns they would 
continue to occupy jobs better given to returning American soldiers. Entities that had effectively 
employed POW labor, particularly the Department of Agriculture as well as various agencies of 
the United States government, resisted repatriation. Id. at 231–33. 
 95 Id. at 235–36. 
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prisoners to Germany at once would risk destabilizing still fragile post-
war Allied rule in sectors across the country.96 But no one appeared to 
question the basic scheme—that the executive, and in particular the 
military, would make the security and policy calculations necessary to 
determine the terms by which wartime detention came to an end. 
III.     KOREA 
From the beginning of U.S. combat operations in Korea in July 
1950, prisoner operations figured centrally in the U.S. mission leading 
U.N. military forces in opposing the Chinese and Soviet-backed North 
Korean invasion of the South.97 The South Korean government had 
vigorously argued that any prisoners taken in the conflict should be 
ideologically segregated—many North Korean fighters were in fact 
South Koreans who had been conscripted by the North’s army, and the 
South maintained they should be classified not as POWs, but released as 
civilian internees.98 When U.S. command initially resisted this 
approach, South Korea removed itself from critical aspects of prisoner 
operations; South Korea continued to supply guards for prison 
operations, but refused to provide food, logistical, or any other form of 
support.99 By 1950, the primary responsibility for maintaining the 
prisoners was thus with the United Nations Command (UNC), led by 
the United States.100 And while thousands of Chinese and North 
Koreans taken prisoner by U.N. forces during the war indeed 
surrendered without fight,101 the South Koreans had been right to 
anticipate that UNC prisoner camps would be plagued by violence, with 
prisoners organizing into communist and anti-communist factions.102 
Worse, dealing with these clashes, and with other aspects of prisoner 
operations, was no small-scale problem. Within the first year of United 
States engagement, U.S. personnel had handled more than 150,000 
prisoners.103 
 
 96 Id. at 233. 
 97 The United States led U.N. Command military forces, and generally dominated policy 
regarding the treatment of prisoners captured during the conflict. SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 
167. 
 98 Id. at 168–69. 
 99 Id. at 167. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 167–68. 
 102 Id. at 168–73. 
 103 Id. at 168; see also 99 CONG. REC. 4271, 4275–76 (1953) (letter from Thruston B. Morton, 
Assistant Sec’y of State, to Sen. William F. Knowland, submitted into record) (reporting that the 
UNC notified the ICRC of approximately 175,000 prisoners taken over the course of the conflict). 
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The subject of repatriation was likewise fraught from the outset. 
The Communist parties took the position that all prisoners must be 
repatriated “without delay” at the end of hostilities, pursuant to the 
terms of the then-newly adopted 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.104 Indeed, while the United States 
in 1950 had signed, but not yet ratified, the 1949 Convention, General 
Douglas McArthur had made it clear that not only U.S. military 
personnel, but also all UNC forces would adhere to the treaty’s 
provisions.105 Yet despite its commitment to abide by the treaty’s terms, 
the United States, as well as the other U.N. forces, sharply resisted the 
Communists’ unconditional claim to prompt repatriation at the end of 
hostilities. The notion that U.N. forces would simply return all captured 
prisoners outright was unattractive for a host of reasons. For one thing, 
the United States suspected Communist forces of having committed 
numerous atrocities against captured prisoners, in manifest violation of 
other provisions of the Geneva Conventions.106 Further, in security 
terms, a wholesale prisoner exchange surely worked to the Communists’ 
military advantage.107 U.N. forces held more than fifteen times the 
number of prisoners Communist forces held (making repatriation a 
major security interest of the Communists).108 
More, and indeed swamping all of these issues in importance at the 
time, was the reality that substantial numbers of prisoners taken by the 
United States and its U.N. allies had no desire to be returned, having 
been conscripted into service in the first place or having surrendered to 
the Americans or their allies on the battlefield.109 Following the much-
criticized Allied decision after World War II to forcibly repatriate 
thousands of Russians and Eastern Europeans who had fought against 
communism, President Truman in particular was not prepared to force 
the repatriation of prisoners against their will.110 It was for this reason 
 
 104 See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364. The Communists also invoked Article 7 of the 
Convention, prohibiting POWs from renouncing any of the rights the Convention guaranteed. 
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 173–74. 
 105 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 168. 
 106 WILLIAM STUECK, THE KOREAN WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 244 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1st prtg. 1995). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 212 (explaining that an “all-for-all” exchange, sought by the Communists, would 
“give the Communists a much greater opportunity to strengthen their forces,” compared to the 
one-for-one exchange the Americans favored); see also SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 174 (noting 
the UNC recommended a one-for-one exchange of prisoners). 
 109 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 167; see also id. at 174–77 (describing thousands of prisoners’ 
refusal of repatriation). 
 110 Id. at 163; STUECK, supra note 106, at 245, 264; see also, e.g., Hanson W. Baldwin, Next 
Steps in Far East Pose Big Dilemma for U.S.: Military Pressure Might Speed a Truce But West is 
 
PEARLSTEIN.36.2.4 12/18/2014  2:58 PM 
644 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:625 
 
that prisoner exchanges and release became a central topic of peace 
discussions from the commencement of talks not long after the U.S. 
entry into the war in July 1951, until the conclusion of the Armistice 
agreement temporarily halting fighting in July 1953.111 Indeed, the 
disposition of prisoners was the single unresolved issue between the 
negotiating sides for the last fifteen months of the war.112 
Given the centrality of prisoner issues to the President’s decision to 
continue to fight a bloody and stalemated war,113 the subject could 
hardly have gone unnoticed on the domestic political scene. Peace 
negotiations were followed regularly on the pages of the New York 
Times, with prisoner repatriation issues in the foreground.114 With the 
fate of prisoners forcibly repatriated after World War II still somewhat 
fresh in memory, domestic political support seemed initially behind 
Truman’s disinclination to force repatriation.115 Yet it need hardly have 
been thus. It is difficult to imagine today any such public consensus 
around a President’s insistence on prolonging an unpopular war for 
more than a year, including the ongoing imprisonment of Americans 
held captive by the other side, in the interest of upholding a principle 
against the forced repatriation of Chinese and North Korean nationals. 
Indeed, the Democrats suffered a sweeping political defeat in 1952, in 
part over the Truman administration’s handling of the prolonged war.116 
When Republican President Eisenhower took office in January 
1953, he likewise faced a fraught political climate, this time from within 
his own party. Republicans held the barest of majorities in the U.S. 
 
Reluctant to Use It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1952, at E3 (describing concerns that anti-communist 
prisoners face torture or death upon repatriation). 
 111 STUECK, supra note 106, at 225 (citing “arrangements relating to prisoners of war” as one of 
the five items identified by the parties to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from 
Korea); see also SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 173. 
 112 Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?, in 
CHILD OF CONFLICT: THE KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP, 1943–1953, at 261–62 (Bruce 
Cumings ed., 1983); see also id. at 306 (noting that during this period, American forces suffered 
an additional 32,000 casualties). 
 113 Bernstein, supra note 112, at 263; see also id. at 276, 278–80 (discussing reasons why the 
President and many in the military opposed forced repatriation, including its effects in 
undermining the willingness of enemy armies to surrender to U.S. forces; the moral injustice of 
the practice; the Cold War political consequences of being seen to pursue a morally suspect 
policy; and the prospect of enjoying a propaganda victory over the Communists). 
 114 See, e.g., Lindesay Parrott, Reds Earlier for Study, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1951, at 1; Lindesay 
Parrott, Reds Must Also Agree Not to Limit Cease-Fire Inspectors to the ‘Ports of-Entry,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1951, at 1; Lindesay Parrot, U.N. Planes in Area of Prisoner Camp, Ridgeway 
Concedes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1952, at 1.  
 115 STUECK, supra note 106, at 264; see also, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 112, at 280 (noting 
significant, if not overwhelming, congressional support for opposing forced repatriation); 
Baldwin, supra note 110 (describing concerns that anti-communist prisoners face torture or death 
upon repatriation). 
 116 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 913 (Simon & Schuster 1992).  
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House and Senate, and a sizable faction on the Republican right 
opposed armistice negotiations at all.117 Communist governments at the 
time continued to back the North Korean cause, and indeed political 
tensions on the Korean peninsula, erupting sporadically in shows of 
military force, remain high to this day.118 Further, armistice negotiations 
had been carried out since 1951 with active congressional debate over 
the Bricker Amendment in the background—a series of attempts led by 
Republican Senator John W. Bricker, with strong Republican support in 
the Senate, to amend the Constitution to restrict executive power to 
conclude treaties and executive agreements—the very process President 
Eisenhower soon vigorously engaged in to bring about a cessation of 
hostilities on the Korean peninsula. For different reasons, Truman or 
Eisenhower might well have come to a different position on the 
significance of repatriating communist war prisoners. 
Yet despite the public and highly politically salient debate 
surrounding the disposition of war prisoners, the continued (and 
projected indefinite) state of tension between the ideologically opposed 
parties, and opportunities for Congress to learn more and engage 
further through regular consultations with the White House over 
armistice negotiations,119 Congress in the end took no action restricting 
executive arrangements on the exchange or repatriation of enemy 
prisoners.120 On a few occasions, Congress requested and was provided 
information about reported prisoner insurgencies in various Korean 
prison camps.121 Toward the end of armistice negotiations, some 
members expressed concern about the role of India as a proposed 
neutral party that could receive prisoners who expressed a desire not to 
return.122 But Congress passed no laws, and otherwise took no 
significant legislative action, related to the subject of prisoners held by 
the United States or UNC forces throughout the period. 
 
 117 STUECK, supra note 106, at 317–19. 
 118 See generally Beina Xu & Jayshree Bajoria, The China-North Korea Relationship, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL.—BACKGROUNDERS (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-
korea-relationship/p11097. 
 119 STUECK, supra note 106, at 323. 
 120 This finding is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large between 1950 and 1954 for any 
textual reference to “Korea and prisoner,” and searches of ProQuest Congressional (including the 
Congressional Record, CRS reports, and other legislative documents) during the same period for 
textual mentions of “Korea and prisoners” and “Korea and Armistice.” 
 121 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 661, 82d Cong. (1952) (“Requesting the Secretary of the Army to furnish 
to the House of Representatives full and complete information with respect to insurgency in 
prisoner-of-war camps in Korea and Communist-inspired disturbances of the peace in Japan”); 
H.R. REP. NO. 2128 (1952). 
 122 See 99 CONG. REC. 4271, 4275–76 (1953) (statement of Sen. William F. Knowland, and 
letters between Sen. Knowland and Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State, submitted 
into record). 
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In the end, prisoner exchanges and repatriation were, again, 
handled by executive agreement. As in previous conflicts, the United 
States had affected multiple exchanges and repatriations before the end 
of the war.123 Consistent with that practice, the U.S. military in the field, 
and the Department of State and the White House in Washington, took 
the lead in crafting U.S. negotiating positions on repatriation at the end 
of the war, and it was through this hard-fought interagency process that 
the U.S. government settled on pursuing the principles supporting the 
prisoner repatriation plan that was ultimately adopted.124  
In spring 1953, the multinational delegates to the armistice talks 
agreed on the exchange of all sick and wounded prisoners in so-called 
“Operation Little Switch,” resulting in the swap of 6670 Communist 
prisoners for 684 United Nations-affiliated personnel.125 It was not until 
that summer that parties reached agreement on the bulk of the 
remaining detainees—an agreement memorialized in Terms of 
Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) (a 
document later annexed to the full armistice agreement that brought 
about a cease-fire in the war).126 Under the Terms of Reference 
supporting what became “Operation Big Switch,” each side agreed to 
turn over any prisoner who refused repatriation to the NNRC, a 
specially created international organization to be run by delegates from 
India.127 The NNRC could hold these prisoners for up to ninety days to 
allow representatives of the prisoners’ home countries to explain to the 
prisoners their rights of repatriation. If after this period, a prisoner still 
declined to accept repatriation, he would be released from prison and 
would assume civilian status.128 Ultimately, approximately 23,000 
Chinese and North Korean prisoners refused repatriation, while more 
than 82,000 agreed to return home.129 The UNC would exchange 76,000 
North Korean and Chinese prisoners for 12,700 allied prisoners then 
 
 123 For example, between July and October 1952, the United States released approximately 
38,000 prisoners, who, according to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, were deliberately 
misclassified as civilian internees so they could be released notwithstanding ongoing negotiations 
over the fate of POWs who did not wish to be repatriated to the Communist North. Bernstein, 
supra note 112, at 307 n.121. 
 124 STUECK, supra note 106, at 259–61. 
 125 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 175–76 (describing “Operation Little Switch” as at the 
instigation of U.S. General Mark W. Clark). 
 126 Agreement on Prisoners of War, U.S.-China-Kor., June 8, 1953, 28 DEP’T ST. BULL. 866, 
reprinted in 47 AM. J. INT’L L. SUP. 180; see also SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 176. 
 127 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 176. 
 128 Id. 
 129 WALTER G. HERMES, TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT app. B-1, B-2 (Stetson Conn ed., 
1966). 
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held by the North.130 The final prisoners—repatriates or not—were 
released from detention by January 1954.131 
IV.     VIETNAM 
Vietnam differed from earlier twentieth century conflicts in a 
variety of respects, the U.S. approach to prisoner detention among 
them. Although U.S. military engagement in Vietnam began at low 
levels during the Eisenhower administration, and both U.S. military and 
intelligence activities in the country increased over the ensuing decade, 
the first U.S. combat troops did not arrive in Vietnam until 1965.132 The 
same year also marked a key shift in the handling of prisoner operations 
in the conflict, a shift important for understanding the nature of 
eventual release and repatriation decisions. Before 1965, the South 
Vietnamese government handled all detention operations, treating 
captured insurgents, fighters, and Communist loyalists of all kinds as 
criminals, and integrating them into the existing domestic prison 
system.133 Although the South Vietnamese had no formal classification 
system, prisoners fell broadly into three categories: (1) uniformed Viet 
Cong or North Vietnamese Army personnel engaging in military 
actions; (2) sympathizers, collaborators, and various clandestine 
supporters of the North, who were neither uniformed nor engaged in 
direct military action; and (3) prisoners of various affiliations wishing to 
defect to the South Vietnamese.134 
This initial South Vietnamese detention program was fraught with 
problems. Civilian jails quickly became overwhelmed, lacking the space 
and personnel to manage the intense prisoner traffic.135 Despite 
worsening violence throughout the period, limited prison capacity 
meant that there was little choice but to release fighters regularly; as new 
prisoners came in, others were quickly discharged.136 Further, the ICRC, 
 
 130 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 177. 
 131 HERMES, supra note 129, at 496.  
 132 See H.R. MCMASTER, DERELICTION OF DUTY: JOHNSON, MCNAMARA, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIETNAM (1998). 
 133 See ROBERT C. DOYLE, THE ENEMY IN OUR HANDS: AMERICA’S TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 
OF WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 302–03 (2010); SPRINGER, supra note 
33, at 182. 
 134 CHERYL BENARD, ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., THE BATTLE BEHIND THE 
WIRE: U.S. PRISONER AND DETAINEE OPERATIONS FROM WORLD WAR II TO IRAQ 34 (RAND 
Corp. 2011) [hereinafter RAND REPORT], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG934.pdf. 
 135 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 181–82; see also RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 37.  
 136 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 37. In 1965, 24,878 political prisoners passed through 
the detention facilities, and 15,987 were released. Average time of confinement for prisoners, 
 
PEARLSTEIN.36.2.4 12/18/2014  2:58 PM 
648 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:625 
 
the United States, and other Western nations raised serious concerns 
about prison conditions and severe prisoner mistreatment.137 Abuses of 
prisoners committed by the South Vietnamese were seen at least as 
partly the responsibility of the United States, the main supporter of the 
South’s effort to contain the insurgency.138 By 1965, increasing U.S. 
military engagement in the conflict, and growing concerns that brutal 
South Vietnamese treatment of Communist prisoners might worsen the 
treatment of U.S. soldiers captured by the North, led the United States 
to engage more aggressively in detention operations in South Vietnam. 
In 1965, the United States established the Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV) under the direction of General William 
Westmoreland to support South Vietnamese detention operations.139 
While the United States continued to turn captured detainees over to 
the South Vietnamese and considered South Vietnam the detaining 
power throughout the conflict,140 the United States was responsible for 
constructing five new prison camps in theater and assisting in their 
administration; the United States insisted that all prisoners be afforded 
POWs status at least until their formal status could be determined; and 
it provided training and guidance to troops on compliance with Geneva 
restrictions on prisoner treatment.141 Further, throughout the conflict, 
the United States urged the parties to pursue a reciprocal program of 
prisoner repatriation—usually in the face of strong resistance by both 
North and South Vietnamese in a position to facilitate prisoner 
exchanges.142 The South Vietnamese government argued that only those 
 
including Viet Cong, was six months. See generally DALE ANDRADÉ, ASHES TO ASHES: THE 
PHOENIX PROGRAM AND THE VIETNAM WAR (1990). 
 137 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 35–36. 
 138 See GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964–1973, at 63 (1975), available at 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/Law-War/law-04.htm (noting that the United States 
maintained that “the hostilities constituted an armed international conflict, that North Vietnam 
was a belligerent, that the Viet Cong were agents of the government of North Vietnam,” and that, 
therefore, the Geneva Conventions were fully applicable); see also Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3364 (stating that “Detaining Power” is responsible for the treatment of POWs even if it 
transfers those prisoners to another power). 
 139 DOYLE, supra note 133, at 191–92. 
 140 See id. at 311; SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 180; see also RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 
35. 
 141 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 39. 
 142 The South Vietnamese proposed returning sixty-two sick and wounded prisoners of war to 
North Vietnam at the Paris Peace Talks of November 13, 1969, but the offer never received a 
response. A January 1971 offer to repatriate all sick and wounded prisoners to North Vietnam, 
and an April 1971 request to North Vietnam to conclude a bilateral agreement for the repatriation 
or internment in a neutral country of those prisoners of war who had been held captive for a long 
period of time, were both ignored. In May 1971, North Vietnam finally agreed to accept 570 sick 
and wounded prisoners. The ICRC ultimately interviewed 660 sick and wounded prisoners, only 
thirteen of whom wished to be repatriated. Before they could be released, North Vietnam 
canceled the agreement, and they were returned to Da Nang. PRUGH, supra note 138, at 71. 
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prisoners who renounced their allegiance to North Vietnam or the Viet 
Cong should be eligible for release before war’s end; the Communists 
refused even to furnish a list of the prisoners they held, and the Viet 
Cong had no committee authorized to conduct negotiations over 
prisoner exchanges.143 Yet even in the face of these hurdles, some 
prisoners were repatriated for medical reasons during the conflict.144 
Indeed, at times U.S. commanders unilaterally released enemy prisoners 
in the hope the North would reciprocate, a result achieved on rare 
occasion.145 Not that such exchanges remotely kept pace with the 
volume of prisoners overall. By the end of 1971, South Vietnam held 
35,665 prisoners, one-third of whom had been captured by U.S. 
forces.146 
While Congress was relatively silent on prisoner issues in the early 
years of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, it did become more 
actively engaged as the conflict lengthened.147 On several occasions, 
Congress legislated out of concern for the mistreatment of U.S. 
prisoners held by the North—in order to ensure American prisoners’ 
families had sufficient benefits148—to express concern for the treatment 
of American POWs, and to condemn enemy violations of the Geneva 
Conventions.149 Indeed, between 1969 and 1971, the House Foreign 
 
 143 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 181. 
 144 See DOYLE, supra note 133, at 309–10. For instance, in April 1967, a screening program was 
started to identify POWs who, because of illness, were qualified for release under Articles 109 and 
110 of the Geneva Conventions. The screening team included two Swiss physicians under 
contract to the ICRC. Of the 286 prisoners screened, 135 qualified medically for repatriation. Of 
those qualified for repatriation, only thirty-nine wished to return to North Vietnam. To this 
group was added a female prisoner of war who had given birth in a South Vietnamese hospital. 
The forty prisoners and the infant were repatriated to North Vietnam through the demilitarized 
zone on June 12, 1967; on the same day, four Viet Cong-United States prisoners were released in 
South Vietnam. During 1967, a total of 139 POWs were released in South Vietnam or repatriated 
to North Vietnam. PRUGH, supra note 138, at 71. 
 145 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 188. For example, in February 1967, twenty-eight North 
Vietnamese prisoners of war were released to return to North Vietnam through the demilitarized 
zone. The following month, two Viet Cong prisoners of war captured by U.S. forces were released 
in response to the release of two U.S. POWs. A few months later, three more Viet Cong captured 
by U.S. forces were released in exchange for the release of two U.S. prisoners and one Filipino 
captured by the Viet Cong. DOYLE, supra note 133, at 309. 
 146 PRUGH, supra note 138, at 67. 
 147 Search: all statutes at large [1959–1976] for reference to Vietnam and prisoner or P.O.W., 
and Congressional Record for mentions of Vietnam and prisoner or POW. Searched ProQuest 
Congressional for mentions of “Vietnam” and “prisoner or POW” returned thousands of results. 
Limited search to “repatriat!” within that search, and turned up little, and nothing of huge import. 
 148 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, 88 Stat. 52 (expanding the period during 
which Social Security Act benefits may be paid); Funeral Transportation and Living Expense 
Benefits Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-257, 88 Stat. 53 (providing benefits to families of U.S. POWs who 
died in prison); Act of June 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-289, 84 Stat. 323 (amending War Claims Act 
of 1948 to include prisoners of war captured during the Vietnam conflict). 
 149 Act of Oct. 31, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-607, 86 Stat. 1948 (making supplemental 
appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973); Proclamation No. 4115, 86 Stat. 1613 
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Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
Developments alone held at least sixteen days of hearings on multiple 
bills and resolutions relating to American POWs in Southeast Asia.150 In 
1970, Congress passed two concurrent resolutions, which dealt with 
American prisoners in Indochina, and again protested the treatment of 
American prisoners by the North and called for justice on their behalf; 
Congress also endorsed efforts to obtain better treatment and release of 
U.S. prisoners.151 Later, the legislature passed “sense of Congress” and 
other hortatory legislation urging the full withdrawal of American 
troops from Vietnam as soon as U.S. prisoners could be recovered.152 
Near the end of U.S. combat presence in Vietnam, Congress passed a 
rider on an appropriations bill prohibiting the use of funds after August 
1973 “to support directly or indirectly combat activities” in Vietnam 
and surrounding countries.153 
 
(Mar. 10, 1972) (highlighting enemy’s Geneva violations and refusal to exchange or repatriate 
prisoners). 
 150 See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., REFERENCE INFORMATION PAPER NO. 90: A 
FINDING AID TO RECORDS RELATING TO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION 
FROM THE VIETNAM WAR ERA, 1960–1994 app. O, available at http://www.archives.gov/
publications/ref-info-papers/90/appendix-o.html; see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 
ALMANAC, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 436–37 (1970).  
 151 See H.R. Con. Res. 582, 92d Cong. (1970) (enacted) (designating May 1, 1970, as a day for 
an appeal for international justice for Americans held prisoner or missing in action in Southeast 
Asia); H.R. Con. Res. 454, 91st Cong. (1970) (enacted) (protesting the treatment given prisoners 
by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and endorsed efforts to obtain better treatment and release). 
 152 In 1971, Congress passed two amendments related to United States withdrawal from 
Vietnam—“sense of Congress” and “policy of the United States”—in order to withdraw U.S. 
forces from Vietnam by a date subject to the release of American prisoners. When signing one of 
them (Military Procurement Authorization, Pub L. No. 92-156, 85 Stat. 423 (1971)), President 
Nixon issued a statement emphasizing that he was not bound by the policy language in the 
amendment. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970’S: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 1972 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS 51–52 
(Comm. Print 1972). The Senate later tried and failed to pass the Mansfield Amendment, binding 
legislation that would require the withdrawal of U.S. forces conditional on release of U.S. 
prisoners of war. For an overview of legislative activity surrounding U.S. foreign policy of the 
area, see COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970’S: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 1973 FOREIGN POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS 51–52 
(Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter 1973 FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS REPORT]. 
 153 An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1973, and 
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 93-50, 87 Stat. 99 (1973) (prohibiting the use of funds after 
August 1973 “to support directly or indirectly combat activities” in or around Vietnam); see also 
1973 FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS REPORT, supra note 152. Notably, a 
contemporary report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office rejected the Defense 
Department’s recent argument that this Vietnam-era statutory restriction on “combat activities” 
meant to include prisoner operations as well. SUSAN A. POLING, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT, NO. B-326013 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665390.pdf 
(concluding that the Defense Department violated “section 8111 of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2014 when it transferred five individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
to the nation of Qatar” in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl without providing at least thirty days’ 
notice to relevant congressional committees). 
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But in none of this legislative activity is there evidence of Congress 
acting to restrict what authority or influence the President or the U.S. 
military had over the release or exchange of Communist prisoners held 
by the South Vietnamese (whether to accelerate or slow repatriation 
efforts). On the contrary, in 1970, three years before the last American 
combat troops left Vietnam, President Nixon called for the immediate 
and unconditional release of all prisoners by both sides; the reaction to 
the proposal on Capitol Hill was “heavily favorable.”154 
Ultimately, as in previous conflicts, the disposition of the vast 
majority of prisoners of both sides captured during the conflict was 
addressed through executive negotiation and conclusion of agreements 
with the enemy. The Paris Peace Accords, negotiated and signed by the 
United States as an executive agreement, entered into force on January 
17, 1973, and were only subsequently submitted to Congress.155 The 
Accords provided for a cessation of all hostilities and required the 
parties to exchange complete lists of all captured military personnel and 
foreign civilians on the date of its entry into force.156 Prisoner 
repatriation would be carried out “simultaneously with and completed 
not later than the same day as” the withdrawal of American troops from 
South Vietnam.157 Remaining prisoner issues, including the return of 
North Vietnamese civilians still held by South Vietnam, were to be 
resolved by a separate agreement between the Vietnamese parties in the 
months following the adoption of the Accords.158 
For the Americans, the Paris Peace Accords were indeed effective 
in securing the return of then-known U.S. POWs; repatriation of 588 
 
 154 See Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Urges Supervised Truce in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos 
and a Wider Peace Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1970, at 1 (describing congressional reaction to 
speech that evening from both sides of the aisle as “heavily favorable”); see also President Richard 
Nixon, Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia (Oct. 7, 1970), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2708. 
 155 WILLIAM GIBBONS & ALLAN FARLOW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESS AND THE 
TERMINATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR 9–10 (1973). 
 156 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam art. 5, U.S.-Viet., Jan. 27, 
1973, 24 U.S.T. 1 (“Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total 
withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel . . . .”). 
 157 Id. art. 8(a) (“The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties 
shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop 
withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-
mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this 
Agreement.”). 
 158 Id. art. 8(c) (“The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and 
detained in South Viet-Nam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of 
the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of 
July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation 
and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite 
families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within 
ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.” (footnote omitted)). 
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American prisoners (including twenty-four civilians) was speedily and 
successfully carried out between February and April 1973.159 For the 
Communist prisoners held by the South, success was less uniform. 
According to the records kept by U.S. Forces, the South Vietnamese 
held approximately 37,000 POWs at the end of American involvement 
in the war, including about 10,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
troops; the remainder were thought to be primarily Viet Cong.160 While 
the NVA troops were repatriated in the months following the Paris 
Accords, thousands of the remaining detainees (exact numbers are 
substantially disputed), many of whom were South Vietnamese 
nationals sympathetic to the insurgency, remained in southern custody 
of one form or another.161 When NVA troops later succeeded in 
capturing Saigon in 1975 and established a unified communist 
government in Vietnam, the remaining detainees were freed.162 Without 
American protection, however, many of those thought to have resisted 
repatriation or collaborated with the enemy were subsequently 
executed.163 
V.     1991 GULF WAR 
The brief duration of the first Gulf War might create the 
misimpression that detention operations in that conflict were relatively 
inconsequential. On the contrary, the U.S. military described the 1991 
conflict as the United States’ largest war prisoner operation since World 
War II.164 Between January 22, 1991, when the first prisoner was 
captured, and May 2, 1991, when the United States transferred the final 
prisoner from its custody, U.S. detention facilities processed nearly 
 
 159  FLOYD S. PARLIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE RETURN OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR 
FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA (1975). 
 160 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 189 (citing REPATRIATION OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, Box 
18, Entry PMG POWD, RG 472, RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 
1950–1975 (1973)). 
 161 SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 189; see also DOYLE, supra note 133, at 289; STAFF OF HOUSE 
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d Cong., VIETNAM—A CHANGING CRUCIBLE: REPORT OF A 
STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH VIETNAM 40 (Comm. Print 1974) (reporting on a mission conducted 
by Rep. Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), Feb. 25–28, 1974, to South Vietnam evaluating fate of 
remaining Communist “political prisoners” held by South); id. at 36 app. 5 (reprinting of 
Airgram-296, Dec. 26, 1973 from American Embassy Saigon to U.S. Department of State assessing 
number of remaining prisoners). 
 162 DOYLE, supra note 133, at 289. 
 163 Id. 
 164 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: AN INTERIM REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (1991) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. INTERIM REPORT], available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/305.pdf. 
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70,000 detainees,165 including through the use of battlefield hearings on 
prisoner status pursuant to Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.166 At the outset of 
hostilities, the United States quickly secured military-to-military 
agreements with allies France and the United Kingdom, setting forth the 
procedure to be followed by any capturing forces in processing POWs 
or other detainees, initially through U.S. detention or medical facilities 
in theater.167 Although American military police and combat engineers 
raced to build prison facilities in theater from scratch,168 the United 
States also undertook a separate agreement with Saudi Arabia that 
authorized the subsequent transfer of many of these prisoners to 
existing Saudi facilities.169 By the end of the conflict, more than 35,000 
prisoners were held in U.S. facilities, with 63,000 more held in Saudi 
Arabia.170 
Almost immediately after U.S. and coalition forces ceased offensive 
operations on February 28, the Iraqis agreed to attend military-to-
military talks to discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities and the 
return of captured prisoners.171 While the Iraqis were prepared 
promptly to return coalition prisoners, they were unprepared to manage 
the influx of the much greater number of Iraqi prisoners held by the 
coalition.172 Furthermore, as quickly became evident to U.S. and 
coalition forces, thousands of Iraqis did not wish to be repatriated, with 
many Iraqi soldiers reportedly saying that they had been conscripted 
into the Iraqi military during visits to Iraq.173 The phenomenon was 
now familiar in U.S. conflicts of the twentieth century. 
Yet despite such potentially complicating circumstances, the 
repatriation or transfer of prisoners following the conflict proceeded 
 
 165 Id. at 12-4. U.S. forces captured more than 60,000 of these; the remainder were seized by 
French and British allies and then transferred to U.S. control. 
 166 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT TO CONG, 
102ND CONG., L-3 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/404.pdf. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Michael R. Gordon, Iraqi War Prisoners Now Find Themselves Men Without a Country, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/05/world/after-the-war-iraqi-war-
prisoners-now-find-themselves-men-without-a-country.html (ultimately housing 15,241 
prisoners, guarded by 1550 Americans). 
 169 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-3. 
 170 War Chronology: March 1991, NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE COMMAND, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/dsmar.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (reporting that 
an additional 3000 or more prisoners were held in Turkey). 
 171 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-3. 
 172 See id. at L-16. 
 173 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-893 F, IRAQ: ADMISSION OF REFUGEES 
INTO THE UNITED STATES (1993); Gordon, supra note 168 (reporting that others asked the 
Americans to take them into custody because they thought it would be the best way of escaping 
from Iraq). 
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with remarkable speed. Iraq and coalition forces reached a 
memorandum of understanding by early March detailing administrative 
procedures for prisoner repatriation to be carried out under the auspices 
of the ICRC. On March 4, Iraq released the first group of coalition 
prisoners, including six Americans. Two days later, the United States 
responded by releasing 294 prisoners to the ICRC for repatriation to 
Iraq.174 Follow-on procedures provided for repatriation of detainees to 
Iraq at a planned rate of approximately 5000 a day.175 Of the 
approximately 14,000 prisoners who did not want to return to Iraq, the 
United States initially embraced only two: one who had dual Iraqi and 
American citizenship and another who had previously resided in the 
United States.176 The remaining prisoners were returned to Saudi 
Arabia,177 with coalition governments taking the position that the non-
repatriating Iraqis should be reclassified as refugees.178 Ultimately, the 
vast majority of prisoners in Saudi Arabia were repatriated to Iraq under 
ICRC auspices after Saddam Hussein issued a general amnesty.179 In all 
events, all prisoners had been transferred from U.S. custody by May 2, 
1991.180 On August 23, the ICRC announced that the repatriation of 
Iraqi prisoners was complete.181 And the ICRC concluded that the 
“treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by U.S. forces was the best 
compliance with the Geneva Convention by any nation in any conflict 
in history.”182 
Despite the relative speed with which the United States and its 
allies carried out both the build up to war and its denouement, 
congressional engagement was hardly impossible. On the contrary, in 
the few months leading up to war, Congress managed to enact multiple 
pieces of legislation variously supporting economic sanctions after Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, authorizing the deployment of forces to defend 
Saudi Arabia, authorizing the use of force in Iraq, authorizing arms sales 
to the Saudis, and appropriating funds to support all of these 
 
 174  War Chronology: January 1991, NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/dsjan2.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 175 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-17. 
 176 See id. at app. O-20; Gordon, supra note 168. 
 177 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 164, at 12-5; see also DOYLE, supra note 
133, at 297. 
 178 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-17. The ICRC urged that the 
non-repatriating Iraqis be treated as civilians protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention. See 
SPRINGER, supra note 33, at 180. 
 179 Richard Serrano, Iraq POWs Paid to Resettle in U.S.; Lawmakers Protest, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
24, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-24/news/mn-27486_1_united-states. 
 180 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at L-17. 
 181 See id. at L-17. 
 182 See id. at L-1. 
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activities.183 Congress was likewise far from blind to the issue of wartime 
detention; just two days after the first capture of Iraqi troops by 
coalition forces, the Senate agreed to a resolution condemning Iraqi 
treatment of its POWs.184 Yet once again, even as the military and 
executive branch negotiated the series of international agreements with 
U.S. allies and eventually the Iraqis themselves for the handling and 
prompt repatriation of Iraqi prisoners, Congress took no steps to 
regulate the executive’s handling of prisoners in our custody.185 
It was only well after the United States had handed its detainees 
over to other international authorities that Congress reawakened to the 
question of our former prisoners. In 1992, the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees expressed concern that some of the ex-Iraqi 
soldiers (about 4000 had remained in refugee status in Saudi Arabia) 
could not be safely returned to Iraq in light of a well-grounded fear of 
persecution.186 In response, the George H. W. Bush Administration 
joined a multinational resettlement effort and decided to admit a 
number of Iraqi refugees into the United States pursuant to existing U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Act authorities.187 Recalling that many 
Iraqi soldiers had surrendered to U.S. forces during the conflict, that 
some had even provided valuable services to U.S. forces in the aftermath 
of the war, and maintaining that all such admissions were within the 
existing United States ceiling for refugees from Near East and South 
Asia, the Bush and then Clinton Administrations admitted close to 
10,000 Iraqi refugees into the United States between 1992 and 1994, 
many of them former war prisoners of the United States.188 
Members of Congress soon raised a variety of concerns: that the 
former detainees were being resettled in cities across the United States at 
 
 183 See CLYDE R. MARK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 91-156 F, IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS: 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION THROUGH JANUARY 1991, at 1–2 (1991) (summarizing congressional 
action on the Persian Gulf crisis through January 1991, including sanctions against Iraq, 
authorization of force, military funding and aid, and arms transfers). 
 184 S. Con. Res. 5, 102d Cong. (1991). 
 185 This conclusion is based on a search of U.S. Statutes at Large (from 1991–1992) for any text 
containing “prisoner and Iraq or Gulf,” as well as a search of ProQuest Congressional 
Publications between Jan. 1, 1990 and Jan. 1, 1992 for any text containing “prisoner and Iraq.” 
 186 REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, NO. A/47/12 
(1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c860.html.  
 187 See KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 2 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107 (2012)); see also Serrano, 
supra note 179. 
 188 See KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 2; see also William Claiborne, Resettling Iraqi POWs in 
U.S. Criticized; Lawmakers Urge Clinton to End ‘Potentially Dangerous,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 
1993. In 1992, the United States admitted 3442 Iraqis—956 from Saudi camps, about 300 of 
whom were former soldiers and their families. KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 3. In 1993, the 
United States admitted 4600 Iraqis, including 533 former soldiers and their families. Id. In 1994, 
the United States admitted approximately 3000 Iraqis, including about 1000 former soldiers and 
their families. Id. 
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public expense (including in California, Florida, Texas, Michigan, and 
Illinois); that the U.S. government was thus placing the interests of these 
former Iraqi soldiers ahead of those of U.S. veterans; and that the Iraqis 
were a potential terrorist threat.189 Ultimately more than eighty 
legislators called on President Clinton to end the “potentially dangerous 
and unfair policy of resettling captured Iraqi soldiers in the United 
States along with deserving civilian Iraqi refugees.”190 Administration 
officials tried to allay these concerns, pointing out that before entering 
the United States, the Iraqis had to be cleared by the FBI and sign a 
promissory note to reimburse the U.S. government for their 
transportation costs after they became self-sufficient.191 Yet even under 
these circumstances, Congress took only the most limited action—a 
non-binding Sense of the Senate resolution expressing the Senate’s view 
that no Iraqi ex-soldier be resettled in the United States unless the 
President certified to Congress that the individual had assisted the 
coalition after capture and had not committed war crimes.192 While the 
Clinton Administration continued working to reassure Congress of the 
program’s adequate checks, resettlement efforts pressed ahead. In 1994 
alone, close to 5000 Iraqi refugees were resettled in the United States.193 
VI.     2003 IRAQ WAR 
Although the United States no longer holds any detainees in its 
custody in Iraq, the history of U.S. detention operations following the 
2003 invasion there is still very much being written. Despite the 
extraordinary public attention focused on detention operations 
following the public revelations of the torture of U.S.-held prisoners 
 
 189 See KATZMAN, supra note 173, at 4; see also Claiborne, supra note 188.  
 190 See Claiborne, supra note 188 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“According 
to a State Department memorandum sent to congressional offices skeptical of the resettlement 
program, ‘many of those persons had provided valuable services to U.S. forces in the aftermath of 
the war.’”). 
 191 Serrano, supra note 179 (“They eventually were repatriated to Iraq under the auspices of 
the International Red Cross after Saddam Hussein issued a general amnesty. But 4,000 remained 
in the camps. Most apparently had surrendered after reading leaflets dropped by U.S. planes that 
guaranteed their safety.”). 
 192 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, H.R. 2401, 103d Cong. § 1164 
(1993) (“It is the sense of the Senate that no person who was a member of the armed forces of Iraq 
during the period from August 2, 1990 through February 28, 1991, and who is in a refugee camp 
in Saudi Arabia as of the date of enactment of this Act should be granted entry into the United 
States under the Immigration and Nationality Act unless the President certifies to Congress 
before such entry that such person—(1) assisted the United States or coalition armed forces after 
defection from the armed forces of Iraq or after capture by the United States or coalition armed 
forces; and (2) did not commit or assist in the commission of war crimes.”). 
 193 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, IRAQI REFUGEE AND ASYLUM-SEEKER 
STATISTICS (2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3e79b00b9.pdf. 
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there—or perhaps because of these and other extraordinary features of 
U.S. operations194—there is as yet no final, official public report 
documenting the number and status of detainees held in U.S. custody in 
Iraq from 2003 to 2011, when the final U.S.-held prisoners were 
transferred or released.195 There are, however, multiple official interim 
reports on various topics, as well as press reports based on periodic 
official statements, which make it possible to draw at least a rough 
sketch of the overall picture of U.S. prisoner operations in Iraq. 
According to a Brookings Institute study of press reports, the 
United States held on the order of 90,000 detainees in Iraq between 2003 
and 2010.196 The numbers fluctuated substantially over the course of the 
conflict. In October 2003, for example, Defense Department 
investigations show that the United States held about 7000 prisoners at 
one of its main in-theater detention facilities at Abu Ghraib.197 The 
number of U.S.-held detainees hit an apex in late 2007, with 
approximately 26,000 detainees (and another approximately 24,000 
individuals in Iraqi government custody).198 By May 2010, according to 
the U.S. Defense Department, the number was down to under 3000.199 
While it is thus apparent that the United States was both capturing 
and releasing detainees throughout the period, to understand why it 
remains less than clear exactly how those decisions were made requires 
some brief background. As post-Abu Ghraib Pentagon investigations 
uniformly concluded, “pre-war planning [for Iraq did] not include[] 
planning for detainee operations.”200 While the Administration stated 
 
 194 For an account of the early legal and policy decision-making that shaped U.S. detention 
operations in Iraq, and set the conditions for the widespread abuses there, see Deborah N. 
Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and 
Torture, 81 IND. L. J. 1255 (2006). 
 195 Charlie Savage, U.S. Transfers Its Last Prisoner in Iraq to Iraqi Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 2011, at A11 [hereinafter Savage, Iraqi Custody]; see also Qassim Abdul-Zahra & Rebecca 
Santana, Iraq: US Hands Over Detainees Save Hezbollah Agent, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2011/11/22/iraq_us_hands_over_
detainees_save_hezbollah_agent (“The U.S. handed over all of the remaining detainees in U.S. 
custody in Iraq Tuesday, except for a Lebanese Hezbollah commander linked to the death of four 
American troops, Iraqi and American officials said.”). 
 196 MICHAEL E. O’HANLON & IAN LIVINGSTON, IRAQ INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF 
RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ 12 (Brookings Inst. ed. 2011).  
 197 JAMES R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW 
DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 11, 59–60 (2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/aug
2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf. 
 198 O’HANLON & LIVINGSTON, supra note 196, at 12; accord RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 
67, fig. 5.4. 
 199 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ 46 (2010) [hereinafter 
DOD 2010 IRAQ REPORT], available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/June_9204_Sec_Def_
signed_20_Aug_2010.pdf. 
 200 ANTHONY R. JONES, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND THE 
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 24 (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (marked “Unclassified”). 
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publicly that it would only hold detainees under the protection of the 
Geneva Conventions,201 the United States early in the conflict began 
housing thousands of detainees in Iraq it classified with a shifting range 
of terms unfamiliar in Geneva-based Army doctrine at the time: enemy 
combatants, unprivileged enemy combatants, security internees, 
criminal detainees, military intelligence holds, persons under U.S. forces 
control, and low-level enemy combatants.202 Traditional categories such 
as prisoner of war were used for only a handful of the thousands of 
prisoners the United States held in its custody.203 At the same time, 
Administration lawyers pursued novel interpretations of various Geneva 
provisions. For instance, Article 49 of Geneva IV broadly prohibits the 
removal of “protected persons from occupied territory.”204 Yet in the 
investigations following Abu Ghraib, it became clear that some 
prisoners had been removed from U.S.-occupied Iraq.205 It also 
eventually became clear that U.S. forces in Iraq were holding prisoners 
without recording their identity or existence on official Army records, 
again a violation of Geneva treaty rules and U.S. implementing 
regulations.206 
 
 201 Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPW’s and War Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (April 7, 2003), 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2281. 
 202  GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 11–12 (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (marked “Unclassified,” with sections redacted) [hereinafter FAY 
REPORT]; DEP’T OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 44–47 
(2004) [hereinafter DAIG REPORT] (unmarked, unclassified). Established military doctrine 
implementing the Geneva regime had recognized four categories of detainees: enemy POWs, 
retained personnel, civilian internees, and a catch-all “other detainee” category. See DAIG 
REPORT, supra, at 44–47; FAY REPORT, supra, at 11–12. 
 203 DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 9–17 (Michael 
Posner ed., 2004) [hereinafter SECRET DETENTIONS], available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/EndingSecretDetentions_web.pdf; 
Enemy Prisoner of War Briefing from Kuwait City, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (May 8, 2003), 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2588. 
 204  Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention categorically prohibits the forcible transfer or 
deportation of “protected persons” outside occupied territory. Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 (entered into force with respect to the United States Feb. 2, 1956) (“Individual or mass 
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the 
territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, 
regardless of their motive.”); see also Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1; Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., on the Permissibility on Relocating Certain “Protected Persons” from Occupied Iraq to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Mar. 19, 2004) [Goldsmith Memorandum], 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/doj_memo031904.pdf. 
 205 In March 2004, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith wrote a confidential memo to 
Alberto Gonzales, arguing that the CIA could secretly transfer prisoners out of Iraq, despite 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See Dana, supra note 204; Goldsmith Memorandum, 
supra note 204. 
 206 SECRET DETENTIONS, supra note 203, at 7. 
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Despite the resulting gaps in public knowledge of some details, the 
significant fluctuation in the number of prisoners held make it clear that 
the United States was engaged in Iraq, as it had been in every previous 
conflict, in prisoner release, transfer, and repatriation efforts throughout 
the conflict. More, these arrangements proceeded under terms set 
almost entirely by the executive branch and America’s international 
partners. For prisoners held in-country immediately following the 
collapse of the Baghdad regime in 2003, detainee policy was set in 
substantial part by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
established in Iraq about one month after U.S. and allied forces took 
control of Baghdad on April 9, 2003.207 While the CPA’s actual 
institutional status remains uncertain—Congress understood it as a U.S. 
federal agency while the Army described it as an international 
organization run by a multinational coalition—the CPA was headed by 
a U.S. presidentially appointed civilian administrator and staffed by a 
mix of U.S. and allied military and civilian personnel.208 
Beginning in 2004, when the Iraqi government re-established 
sovereign control, and continuing until 2008, detention operations were 
governed by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1546, adopted pursuant to the Council’s authority under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter. UNSCR 1546 established the authority of a 
coalition of multinational forces to support the Iraqi government 
(MNF-I).209 Under this authorization, U.S. military-led Task Force 134 
(TF-134) had responsibility for U.S. detention operations in Iraq.210 
While the description of who could be detained—and subject to 
what set of procedural protections—pursuant to these shifting 
authorities varied over time,211 both CPA rules and Defense Department 
 
 207 L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32370, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL 
AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES (2005) 
[hereinafter HALCHIN CRS REPORT], available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32370.pdf. The 
CPA was charged with a broad mission: “to restore conditions of security and stability, to create 
conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future (including by 
advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative 
governance) and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.” Id. 
at 1 (quoting U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 
1506 OF THE EMERGENCY WARTIME SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2003 (PUBLIC LAW 
108-11), at 2 (2003)). 
 208 Id. at 5 (noting that it was unclear whether the CPA was established under the President’s 
authority, the U.S. military’s authority, or pursuant to UN Security Council authorization). 
 209 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004); see also Brian J. Bill, Detention 
Operations in Iraq: A View from the Ground, 86 INT’L L. STUD. 411, 416 (2010). This initial 
resolution was set to expire in 2005; subsequent resolutions extended its authority until the end of 
2008. See S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); S.C. Res. 1723, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1637, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 8, 2005). 
 210 Bill, supra note 209, at 417–18. 
 211 In its initial detention policy memorandum, issued in June 2003, the CPA identified two 
categories of detainees: (1) security detainees, who were to be provided periodic administrative 
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implementing directives provided for some form of periodic review of 
the continued need for detention.212 Release decisions could be made at 
multiple levels of review, with final release recommendations made—if 
not earlier—by a joint U.S.-Iraqi committee, and releases carried out 
subject to the approval of the U.S. Deputy Commanding General for 
Detention Operations.213 
Throughout the U.N. mandate period, both detention and release 
of prisoners were commonplace. At times, releases were pursued for 
relatively isolated reasons. The Iraqi government, for example, 
announced that it intended to release some 2000 prisoners in time for 
the Eid holiday in 2006 as a goodwill gesture, and U.S. commanders felt 
little choice but to help comply.214 More common were regular 
recommendations for and approvals of release, a rate that varied during 
the period (depending on the applicable review systems, the strategic 
environment, and so forth) from 12–15% of detentions reviewed early 
in the period, to 25–40% of detentions reviewed toward the end of the 
United Nations-authorized detention operations.215 Beyond this, some 
detainees suspected of criminal activity were transferred to the Iraqi 
criminal justice system for prosecution.216 Further, as U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq evolved through 2007, U.S. 
commanders pursued the creation of local “reconciliation” centers, 
where recently released detainees would be provided civic and 
vocational training. Both these post-detention support opportunities 
 
hearings, including by a joint Iraqi-U.S. Combined Review Board, based on Geneva Convention 
provisions regarding detention during occupation; and (2) criminal suspects, who were to be 
transferred to Iraqi domestic authorities for prosecution. RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 51–
52. From 2004 to 2008, under the UNSCR 1546 scheme, coalition forces were permitted to pursue 
“internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security,” again modeled after 
Geneva rules for circumstances of occupation. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 209, at 11. TF-134’s 
detention operations soon expanded to include not only the categories of detainees recognized by 
the CPA, but also individuals who were wanted for questioning more broadly, or who were 
perceived as obstructing military operations. RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 58. 
 212 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2310.01E: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETAINEE 
PROGRAM ¶ 4.8 (2006) [hereinafter DoDD 2310.01E], available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
pdfs/Detainee_Prgm_Dir_2310_9-5-06.pdf; L. PAUL BREMER, COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., 
MEMORANDUM NO. 3 (REVISED): CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, CPA/MEM/27 (2004) [hereinafter 
CPA MEMO 3], available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAMEMO_3_
Criminal_Procedures__Rev_.pdf. For a description of the procedures followed in practice, see 
Bill, supra note 209. 
 213 Bill, supra note 209, at 427–28, 431. 
 214 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 59 (reporting these releases took place even as TF-134 
struggled, sometimes unsuccessfully, to keep track of its remaining prisoners). 
 215 Bill, supra note 209, at 432. 
 216 RAND REPORT, supra note 134, at 60 (noting that the Iraqi criminal justice system suffered 
a variety of problems and did not always succeed in prosecution justifying continued custody). 
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and prisoner release ceremonies in particular became important tools of 
counterinsurgency strategy touted by U.S. officials to the Iraqi press.217 
After 2004, it can hardly be doubted that Congress was acutely 
aware of U.S. detention operations in Iraq. The revelations of torture at 
Abu Ghraib had been followed by an intense flurry of legislative activity, 
hearings and legislation, geared toward addressing issues of prisoner 
treatment.218 Congress also engaged vigorously over what was to be 
done about an insurgency that appeared to be gaining strength. Yet on 
the question of who could be transferred or released from U.S. custody 
in Iraq under the baseline processes in effect from 2003 to 2008, 
Congress was, characteristically, silent. Perhaps even more remarkably, 
Congress’ relative non-involvement on detention issues held even as the 
United States undertook negotiations beginning in 2008 over the 
framework agreement for continued U.S. presence in—and eventual 
withdrawal from—Iraq. With the question of what to do with the 
remaining detainees regularly on the front page of the New York 
Times,219 and the operative U.N. mandate for U.S. forces in Iraq set to 
expire at the end of that year,220 Congress did not hesitate to take on a 
range of issues regarding the terms of any agreement with the still fragile 
Iraqi government for continued U.S. participation.221 Members of 
Congress proposed a series of measures demanding that the President 
get congressional authorization for any agreement he might reach.222 
Indeed, Congress succeeded in enacting several conditions on the 
expenditure of defense funds in 2007 and 2008 bearing directly on the 
agreement—conditions prohibiting the use of any funds to enter into a 
 
 217 Id. at 72–74. 
 218 See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. § 1003(a) (2005) (“No 
individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, 
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”); see also Harold Hongjuh Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in 
Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006) (describing activities surrounding passage of legislation). 
 219 See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, A Puzzle Over Prisoners as Iraqis Take Control, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2008, at A1. 
 220 S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007); see also Press Release, The White 
House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Iraq Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation (Nov. 26, 
2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/2007
1126-1.html. 
 221 See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34568, U.S.-IRAQ AGREEMENTS: 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 7 (2009), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125517.pdf (listing proposed and enacted 
legislation). 
 222 As senators, both Vice President Biden and Secretary of State Clinton introduced 
legislation to require consultation with, and approval from, Congress before the Agreements with 
Iraq were finalized. Then-Senator Obama was a co-sponsor of then-Senator Clinton’s bill, S. 2426, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
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permanent basing rights agreement with Iraq;223 prohibiting the use of 
funds for any agreement that would subject members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces to the jurisdiction of Iraq criminal courts or punishment under 
Iraq law;224 and requiring the post hoc reporting to Congress of any 
agreement reached with Iraq bearing on those subjects, or on the rules 
of engagement under which U.S. troops operate in Iraq, or on any 
longer term security commitment with Iraq.225 The post hoc reporting 
provision even required “[a]n assessment of authorities under the 
agreement” for U.S. and coalition troops “to apprehend, detain, and 
interrogate prisoners and otherwise collect intelligence.”226 Yet none of 
these conditions in any way restricted the military’s authority to 
continue its prisoner release and repatriation programs as it saw fit. 
Ultimately, the United States negotiated two significant 
instruments with Iraq as executive agreements on November 18, 2008: 
the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship 
and Cooperation Between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Iraq,227 and an Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States 
Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their 
Temporary Presence in Iraq (the Security Agreement).228 The impact of 
these agreements on U.S. detention operations in Iraq would be 
substantial. Pursuant to the Security Agreement, U.S. forces would no 
longer be permitted to detain any person unless Iraqi officials requested 
it, or the arrest was otherwise in accordance with Iraqi law.229 Any 
detainees picked up pursuant to these rules would have to be turned 
over to the Iraqi authorities within twenty-four hours of their arrest.230 
Further, the United States committed to “release all the remaining 
detainees in a safe and orderly manner unless otherwise requested by 
[the Iraqi government].”231 Pursuant to the terms of the Security 
Agreement, the United States released or transferred more than 8000 
 
 223 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 680, 121 Stat. 1844, 2359 
(2007.). 
 224 Id. § 612. 
 225 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-
417, § 1212(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4356, 4627 (2008). 
 226 Id. § 1212(b)(4). 
 227 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation Between 
the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.usf-iraq.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/security-agreement-2.pdf. 
 228 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the 
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During 
Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008 [hereinafter Security Agreement], 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf. 
 229 Id. art. 22 ¶ 1. 
 230 Id. art. 22 ¶ 2. 
 231 Id. art. 22 ¶ 4. 
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prisoners between January 2009 (when the Security Agreement went 
into effect) and June 2010.232 
It was only beginning in 2009, as U.S. operations in Iraq drew to a 
close, that Congress began to focus more directly on prisoner transfer 
and release operations. But in no case did Congress impose actual 
restrictions on U.S. release and transfer efforts, which continued apace. 
Most concrete among congressional activities during this period was to 
impose additional post hoc reporting measures in 2009, including for 
the first time requiring the Administration to keep it informed of how 
many prisoners the United States transferred or released from its 
custody in Iraq.233 As the Administration worked through the final 
prisoners in its custody in 2011, several members of Congress expressed 
concern about the handling of a few discrete cases.234 Some had argued 
that certain U.S.-held prisoners in Iraq, suspected of criminal activity, 
should be transferred to Guantanamo Bay and prosecuted in military 
commissions, rather than left to the Iraqi authorities for prosecution, 
even if it meant secreting the detainees out of the country against the 
wishes of the new Iraqi Prime Minister.235 Yet these expressions of 
concern were ultimately unproductive; Congress took no particular 
action on individual cases either. And by the end of December 2011, the 
United States was out of the detention business in Iraq.236 
CONCLUSION 
For the majorities of Congress who have voted repeatedly to 
embrace stark restrictions on the President’s authority to transfer, 
 
 232 DOD 2010 IRAQ REPORT, supra note 199. DOD filed reports with Congress providing this 
information in September and December 2009, and in March and July 2010, which are all 
available online. See id. While press reports make clear that additional detainees were released 
following July 2010, there is no similar record of subsequent reports to Congress. 
 233 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 
§ 1227(b)(4), 123 Stat. 2190, 2526 (2009) (requiring assessment of, inter alia, total number of 
detainees held by the United States in Iraq, number of detainees transferred to Iraqi authorities, 
the number of detainees who were released from U.S. custody and the reasons for their release, 
and “the number of detainees who having been released in the past were recaptured or had their 
remains identified planning or after carrying out attacks on United States or Coalition forces”). 
 234 See, e.g., Liz Sly & Peter Finn, U.S. Hands over Hezbollah Prisoner to Iraq, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-hands-over-
hezbollah-prisoner-to-iraq/2011/12/16/gIQABm2oyO_story.html (reporting several Members’ 
concern over the transfer to Iraqi criminal authorities of Ali Musa Daqduq, a senior member of 
the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement, suspected of killings five U.S. soldiers in 2007). 
 235 See, e.g., id. 
 236 Savage, Iraqi Custody, supra note 195; see also Abdul-Zahra & Santana, supra note 195 
(“The U.S. handed over all of the remaining detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq Tuesday, except for 
a Lebanese Hezbollah commander linked to the death of four American troops, Iraqi and 
American officials said.”). 
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prosecute, or release prisoners at Guantanamo Bay in recent years, the 
motives are undoubtedly varied. Some no doubt harbor sincere 
concerns about the security impact of releasing certain individual 
detainees, even to countries far removed from the United States—
particularly when those individuals have stated they remain committed 
to doing America harm, and particularly when those individuals could 
only be sent to countries still in sufficient turmoil to lack well 
established security systems themselves.237 Yet without discounting the 
significance of such concerns, history demonstrates that it is precisely 
such risks the United States has repeatedly embraced in order to reap 
the greater benefit of bringing wars to an end. 
For many, the response (post-September 11) to any argument from 
historical example has been to insist on the uniqueness of current 
circumstances. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are a different kind of enemy; 
the war we have been fighting since 2001 is a different kind of war.238 In 
one sense, this is, of course, true.239 But in key respects, there are 
important parallels. The notion of returning prisoners to a homeland of 
violent political instability, for example, is not new. We returned 
prisoners twice to post-war European nations whose economic, 
political, and state security systems had been decimated by what were 
then the most destructive wars history had ever known. Neither is it the 
case that we would never release prisoners who still harbor violent 
intentions toward the United States. In World War II, among the first 
prisoners released were those Nazis whose enmity was “most hardened” 
against us. Nor can it be contended that we would never release 
prisoners as long as they have ideological brethren with whom they 
might again affiliate in re-engaging the fight. We returned thousands of 
 
 237 See, e.g., Stacy Kaper, Obama, Congress Bring Guantanamo Bay Prison Closer to Closed, 
NAT’L J. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/obama-congress-bring-
guantanamo-bay-prison-closer-to-closed-20131223 (“‘While calling for the closure of 
Guantanamo Bay makes a great campaign talking point, doing so will undermine good 
intelligence collection and increase the risk that the dangerous detainees who are held there will 
be back on the streets plotting to kill Americans . . . .’” (quoting Senator Saxby Chambliss)). 
Others may vote in favor of such restrictions out of a sense of the necessity of political 
compromise; the restrictions have invariably been attached to mammoth defense spending bills, 
essential to fund a vast array of U.S. defense and security operations of which Guantanamo is but 
a small part. See Press Release, Statement by the President on H.R. 3304 (Dec. 26, 2013), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/statement-president-hr-3304. 
 238 See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President 
George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB
127/02.01.25.pdf. 
 239 Indeed, many have argued that outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States’ insistence 
on treating its engagements with al-Qaeda and affiliates as a “war” at all is without justification in 
any legal sense contemplated by the Geneva Convention regime; in combating terrorist 
organizations, the argument goes, the criminal law, not the law of war, is the appropriate 
framework. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 95–97 (2010).  
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communist prisoners to communist nations—for a half-century our 
most feared, most hated ideological opponents—at the height of a half-
century long war that was “hot” (in Korea and Vietnam) almost as often 
as it was cold, and that was defined by the standing deployment of U.S. 
armed forces to countries all over the world.240 
Of equal relevance, we returned prisoners not only to state 
enemies, but also to non-state enemies as well.241 In Vietnam, we at 
times unilaterally released Viet Cong prisoners, taking a calculated risk 
that any short-term tactical burden we might bear was outweighed by 
the long-term strategic benefit to the United States of acting, and being 
seen to act, in a manner consistent with the law. 
History need not be understood as constitutionally binding to offer 
useful insights into contemporary problems. It may at the least offer 
reassurance that the United States has long experience in bringing 
wartime detention to an end. 
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